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We develop a model that shows that inefficient legal protections, disproportionately 
increase financial restrictions for debtors that have less wealth. Due to fixed 
monitoring costs in equilibrium banks will not monitor small firms and therefore 
these firms will adopt risky technologies that imply a higher probability of 
bankruptcy. This implies that inefficiencies in the bankruptcy procedure will have a 
greater effect on small firms vis a vis large ones. Using a survey of  firms in 62 
countries around the world (WBES) and econometric techniques that allow us to 
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partial endogeneity, we explore the role of creditor protection on small and 
medium-size enterprises' access to bank credit. We find that better protection of 
creditors reduces the financing gap between small and large firms. 
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CRÉDITO BANCARIO A FIRMAS PEQUEÑAS Y MEDIANAS: 







Desarrollamos un modelo que muestra que fallas en la protección de los derechos 
de los acreedores incrementan las restricciones financieras que enfrentan los 
deudores más pequeños. Debido a la existencia de costos fijos de monitoreo, en 
equilibrio los bancos no monitorean a las firmas pequeñas y estas adoptan 
tecnologías más riesgosas con mayor probabilidad de bancarrota.  Esto implica 
que las ineficiencias en el proceso de bancarrota afectan más a las firmas 
pequeñas que a las grandes. Utilizando una encuesta de firmas en 62 países del 
mundo y técnicas econométricas que permiten lidiar con componentes 
observables y no observables específicos a cada país, así como con problemas de 
endogeneidad, exploramos empíricamente el impacto de la protección de los 
acreedores sobre el financiamiento a la pequeña y mediana empresa. 
Encontramos que mejoras en la protección de los acreedores reducen la brecha 
de financiamiento entre empresas grandes y pequeñas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent corporate finance literature has emphasized the role played by 
financial development and legal protections to outside creditors in the performance 
of firms. One of the crucial implications of this literature is that underdeveloped 
financial and legal systems may constrain firms in their ability to finance 
investment
1. Bank credit in particular plays a very important role for firms, 
especially in developing countries where equity markets are considerably 
underdeveloped. When access to bank loans is restricted, potentially profitable 
projects cannot be undertaken and economic activity can stagnate. If credit is 
constrained, so is investment, and since technology is often embedded in new 
capital goods, the capacity of economies to absorb new methods of production and 
to grow is adversely affected. 
This paper explores how different legal and institutional setups can have an 
asymmetric impact on the access to credit of firms of different sizes. The main idea 
of this study is that weak enforcement of credit contracts or inefficient bankruptcy 
procedures take a higher toll on small firms than large ones due to monitoring 
costs faced by lenders. We formalized this, using a model based on the standard 
idea that it is not easy for lenders to enforce both a particular use of the credit 
granted and the level of entrepreneurial effort. The model introduces these two 
type of moral hazard, combining the formulation in Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997, 
1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987), standard references in the corporate finance 
literature. 
Three important conclusions emerge from our model. First, large firms tend 
to be more leveraged than small firms; second, large firms tend to be less volatile 
than small firms due to their technology adoption; and third, improvements in 
contract enforcement or the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures increase access to 
credit of small firms relative to large ones. 
The first two implications of our model have been verified elsewhere. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) shows that in all G7 countries but Germany small firms have 
lower leverage level than large ones. Using broader data, similar those used in the 
empirical section of this study, several authors have shown that across the world   4
the first of the implications above holds, that is, small firms are less leveraged than 
large ones
2. Table 1 summarizes data, whose source is discussed below, which 
show that in the World as a whole, as well as for developing countries exclusively, 
the share of investment financed with bank credit is larger in large firms. In our 
sample an average small firm finances around 11% of its investment with credit, 
while medium and large firms finance 17% and 26% respectively
3. 
The second implication, that large firms are less volatile, has also been 
amply documented. Table 2 presents summary data from a set of papers that have 
explored this issue in detail for the case of employment volatility. The table shows 
that job turnover, a measure of employment volatility, is significantly higher in small 
firms as opposed to large firms both in Latin American developing countries and 
the United States
4. 
The purpose of the empirical part of this paper is to explore in detail the third 
implication of our model, namely that improvements in the quality of bankruptcy 
procedures as well as in the enforcement of credit contracts reduces the gap in 
credit access between small and large firms
5. For this purpose we use the World 
Bank’s World Business Environment Survey, a firm level survey carried out in 1999 
and 2000 among firms across the world to assess competitiveness, and we 
perform a series of econometric exercises to validate the theoretical model. Figure 
1 compares the share of investment financed with credit in firms of different sizes 
in Common Law countries vis a vis non common law countries. La Porta et al 
(1998), for example, show that Common Law countries have better creditor 
protection and enforceability than others. In line with this, Figure 1 shows that, for 
each size category, firms in Common Law countries are more leveraged. Second, 
and more interesting, the gap in access to credit between large and small firms is 
larger in non Common Law countries. This result is in line with the third prediction 
of our paper. In section 4 we use a difference-in-difference econometric approach 
to analyze the impact of different degrees of creditor protection on the financing 
gap of small creditors relative to large ones. The methodology controls for country-
specific effects and allows us to deal with a possible omitted variable problem   5
common to many cross country studies. By doing so, our empirical study allows us 
to identify causal links between the institutional data and access to credit. 
Most of previous theoretical research does not focus on the distinction 
between SMEs and large firms. Moreover, a simple extension of these models to 
account for small and large firms fails to explain why large firms are leveraged, less 
risky and why the credit access gap between large and small firms is decreasing 
with better creditor protection. For example, most standard models imply that small 
firms should be equally or more leveraged than large ones, and in equilibrium all 
firms adopt the same type of technology
6. As we already mentioned, combining 
two standard models in corporate finance, our theoretical setup replicates, in a 
simple way, all the three stylized facts described above for SMEs. 
Our paper is an addition to the vast literature on the role of institutions in 
economic development. Numerous empirical papers have shown the strength of 
the links between access to finance and growth. For example, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) show that financial development positively affects the growth rate of 
industries relying heavily on external financing. At the firm level Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) show the importance of the financial system and the rule of law 
in relaxing external financing constraints and facilitating growth, using a data set of 
large firms around the world. Similarly, Love (2003) shows that in countries with 
deeper financial markets large firms are less credit constrained, and the 
dependency of investment on cash flow is reduced. Using sector-level data, Braun 
and Larraín (2004), show that better accounting standards ease financial 
constraints over the business cycle. 
In general, the literature on credit restrictions in firm development stresses 
the role of asymmetric information in credit rationing
7. The consequences of 
information and incentive problems for investment have been explored in many 
papers
8. Regarding the size of firms, the empirical literature on financial 
constraints, for example has pointed out that small firms tend to be more credit 
constrained than large ones
9. The apparent fact, though, is that under similar 
institutional setups smaller firms tend to face deeper constraints than larger ones. 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), for example, find that the effect of   6
institutions on firms' growth can be asymmetric depending on the size of firms. In 
fact, they find that legal and financial development impacts the growth of firms 
especially in small and medium-sized ones.  
Our paper complements this work by providing a rigorous analysis of the 
channels through which such a relationship can work.  In further work Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) explore the differential impact of financial 
development and "financing obstacles" on access to external finance of firms of 
different sizes, and find that financial development has a differential impact on 
firms of different sizes
10. 
In a study on the impact of financial development on financial constraints in 
the context of a dynamic investment model, Love (2003) finds that financial 
development favors small firms relatively more than larger ones. Our paper goes 
beyond these studies and explores the impact of the institutions underlying 
financial development, in particular de jure creditors' protection and their 
enforcement, on access to bank credit by SMEs. We focus exclusively on bank 
credit, due to the fact that this is the primary source of external funding for most 
firms particularly in developing countries. In the paper we provide an analytical 
framework to support the empirical analysis, and using a difference in difference 
approach we compute the impact of creditor protection on SME access to Bank 
Credit. As opposed to Beck, Demirguc Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) we use fixed 
effects and error clustering to solve omitted variable bias and downward bias in 
standard errors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model, Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical study, Section 
4 presents our econometric strategy and some basic results, Section 5 reports 
some robustness exercises performed, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. CREDITOR PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO CREDIT: A MODEL 
 
In this section, we describe a model that serves the purpose of deriving 
testable hypotheses for the empirical part of the paper. The model is based on the 
standard idea that it is difficult for a lender to enforce both a particular use for the   7
credit granted and the level of entrepreneurial effort. The model introduces these 
two types of moral hazard, combining the formulations in Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997, 1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987). Broadly speaking, we assume that 
there are two kinds of risk-neutral agents. Borrowers face profitable investment 
opportunities but do not have enough cash for financing their own projects. Banks, 
on the other hand, have plenty of cash, but no investment opportunities. 
The main intuition of the model is that banks have a monitoring technology 
that forces entrepreneurs to adopt a safe technology that reduces the "assets 
substitution moral hazard" and increases leverage. The monitoring action has a 
fixed cost per entrepreneur and therefore is only worth using when the 
entrepreneur has a high level of wealth (required to reduce the effort moral 
hazard), which implies a high level of investment. The solution of the model shows 
that in equilibrium banks will not monitor small borrowers (hereafter we will refer to 
the entrepreneurs with low initial wealth as SMEs). This increases the moral 
hazard problem for small firms and will induce them to adopt a risky technology 
with a higher probability of bankruptcy. We show that improvements in the 
efficiency of bankruptcy procedures have a larger positive effect on SMEs than 
large firms. 
In the model we assume that the borrower faces an investment opportunity 
at date t0 that returns R 
j per unit of investment at date t1 in case of success and L 
in case of failure (residual value per unit of investment). However, the project is 
subject to two types of moral hazard. On one hand, the borrower may choose 
between two technologies with different level of risk but similar expected payoff 
(=Ω). The risky technology has a payoff (R
r) larger than the safe technology (R
s) in 
case of success, but its probability of success is lower (π
s>π
r)
11. On the other hand, 
regardless of the technology adopted, the probability of success depends on the 
entrepreneur's effort. When the entrepreneur does not behave in terms of the level 
of effort, the probability of success is reduced by ∆π
e. Due to this lack of effort the 
entrepreneur obtains a private benefit of B>0 per unit of investment, regardless of 
the outcome of the project and the technology adopted. For both technologies, we   8
assume that the net present value of the project is negative in case the 
entrepreneur shirks (low effort and therefore lower probability of success)
12. 
Now we turn to describing the kind of contracts that can be written and 
enforced. Let I denote total investment and suppose that a bank is willing to lend 
C=I-W to the borrower, where W denotes the amount of wealth that the 
entrepreneur puts in the project. In case of success, the lender pays the borrower 
RB per unit of investment; in case of failure, she pays him nothing. However, when 
the project fails, an outcome that we interpret here as bankruptcy, the residual 
investment  I∗L  is liquidated. Due to problems in the bankruptcy procedure the 
residual value of this investment is only αIL. In this setup α is a measure of creditor 
protection. 
Banks, beside fixing the level of credit and lending interest rate (implicit in 
RB),  have the ability to monitor the project, in which case they may force the 
entrepreneur to adopt the safe technology. This monitoring action has a fixed cost 
ψ  per entrepreneur. Banks have a zero cost of funding and the banking industry is 
competitive (banks break even in equilibrium). To focus on the interesting case in 
which entrepreneurs go bankrupt in case the project fails, we impose parameter 
conditions in which in equilibrium banks always charge a positive lending interest 
rate
13. 
Finally, we assume there are two types of entrepreneurs with two different 
levels of wealth, those whose wealth is greater than W , and those with less wealth. 
In the next section we solve the model. First we solve conditional that one 
type of technology is adopted, and then we endogenize the technology adoption as 
well as the bank's decision whether to monitor or not. 
 
2.1. SOLUTION CONDITIONAL TO THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Conditional to the adoption of a technology the entrepreneur maximizes the 
following problem.   9
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Where IC is the incentive compatibility constraint and BP is the bank's 
participation constraint. Banks are competitive, therefore in equilibrium they break 
even (that is the bank's participation constraint is binding). In addition, as profits 
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  This condition implies that investment is proportional to the level of the 
entrepreneur's wealth. The second term in the expression is known in the 
corporate finance literature as the "equity multiplier". This multiplier is increasing 
with our measure of creditor protection (α) and decreasing with the severity of the 
moral hazard problem (B). From the previous equation we can derive the 
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Given that the project's net present value of shirking is lower than the one with 
effort (even considering the private benefit), the second equation implies that the 
leverage level will be lower under the adoption of the risky technology (lower π)
14. 
Equation (2) also shows that a greater severity of the moral hazard problem (larger 
B) the lower will firm leverage be in equilibrium. The opposite occurs with the 
degree of creditor protection, higher creditor protection (￿), leads to more credit. 
The detrimental effect of lack of creditor protection is increasing with the probability 
of failure. Bad institutions hurt during bankruptcy procedures.   10
Replacing the solution in the entrepreneur's profit function we have: 
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− − + = Π  (3) 
The profit function is an increasing linear function of wealth. The first term in 
equation (3) is the profit per unit of investment (unit-profit), and the second term is 
the already defined "equity multiplier". It is interesting to note that both the unit-
profit and the "equity multiplier" are lower under the risky project (lower  π), 




2.2. THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Once C and RB are fixed (for a given W and therefore for I), the limited 
liability characteristic of the debt contract and the same expected return of both 
technologies imply that an entrepreneur would always choose the risky technology. 
This is the standard "asset substitution moral hazard" first pointed out by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Choosing only technology, the entrepreneur maximizes: 
W R R C W B − − + ) ( ) ( max π
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For both cases, that is, if the bank believes that the entrepreneur will choose 
either the high or low risk technology, the term in parenthesis 
( L
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) is positive, therefore the entrepreneur's expected profit is 
higher with the risky technology
16. 
 
2.3 BANK PROJECT EVALUATION 
 
    Given that banks are competitive and therefore always break even, a bank 
decides to evaluate the project before lending if and only if the entrepreneur's   11
profits are higher with monitoring (Π(W,ψ)) than without it (Π(W,0)). We already 
know that once I and RB are fixed, the entrepreneur would always adopt the risky 
technology unless he or she is forced by the bank to use the safe one. Therefore, 
using equation [3], the bank would monitor the entrepreneur if and only if: 
  
) ( ) ( ) 0 , ( ) , (
s s W W W W π ψ π ψ Φ > − Φ ⇔ Π > Π     
From the previous section, we know that the profit per unit of entrepreneur's 
wealth is larger for the safe technology () ( ) (
r s π π Φ > Φ ), therefore the bank would 
monitor the entrepreneur if and only if: 
W W r s =
Φ − Φ
>
) ( ) ( π π
ψ
   (4) 














































Due to low levels of wealth, projects undertaken by small firms ( W W ≤ ) are 
riskier than the ones undertaken by large firms. This occurs because in equilibrium 
the former choose the risky technology (low π). Such risky choice implies that their 






− ).  In 
addition, for both types of firms an improvement in creditor rights (α) will increase 
the firm's leverage (
I
C
).  However, the increase will be larger for small firms 
( W W ≤ ).  The empirical section of this paper tests these results assuming that 
there is a match between firm size and the level of wealth, i.e. entrepreneurs in 
small and medium sized enterprises (SME) have a low initial level of wealth. 
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3. DATA 
 
This section describes the data sources and the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. Our main source of data is the World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)
17, and several research pieces that have gathered valuable 
information on the state of creditor protection around the world
18. For the purposes 
of this paper the dependent variable is the leverage of firms of different sizes. The 
theoretical section above suggests that access to credit, defined as the share of 
investment financed with banking credit, depends on creditor rights, the size of 
firms, and the interaction of these two. 
The WBES is a firm-level data set that consists of responses by more than 
10,000 firms across the world to different questions related to a country's business 
environment. The survey was carried out in 1999 and 2000. The survey includes 
questions that describe the financing structure of firms. Enterprise managers were 
asked to report how much of their investment was financed over the last year, from 
the following sources: i) retained earnings, ii) funds from family and friends, iii) 
equity, iv) supplier credit, v) leasing arrangements, vi) money lenders, vii) other 
public sector support,  viii) local commercial banks, ix) foreign banks, x) 
development banks, xi) and others. For our purposes we define the dependent 
variable as the sum of the fraction of investment financed using credit provided by 
local commercial banks and foreign banks and label it as "access to bank credit"
19. 
When constructing the access to bank credit variable we are very careful in 
dropping erroneous data. We drop all firms that report that the sum of their funding 
sources is less than 90% and also drop those that report that their funding sources 
exceed 110%. We allow the possibility of small mistakes in the respondent’s 
addition, but eliminate excessively erroneous data. 
Another crucial firm level variable in our analysis is the size of firms. Once 
again this is obtained from the WBES. The WBES classifies firms into three 
different size groups: small firms are defined as those with more than 5 and less 
than 50 workers, medium are those with more than 50 but less than 500, and large 
as those with more than 500. Other firm level variables included in our empirical 
analysis that can affect access to finance such as the ownership structure, the   13
export orientation, the economic sector in which the firm operates, are detailed in 
the Appendix. 
    To measure creditor protection we use a set of variables frequently cited in 
related literature
20. The variables are measures of certain institutions and rules and 
regulation that directly affect the extent to which creditors can seize collateral 
effectively and efficiently. We use a measure of rule of law that captures the 
degree of law enforcement in a country. Presumably in countries with poor rule of 
law, credit contracts tend to be less enforced than where rule of law is high. We 
use a direct measure of creditor rights based on La Porta et al. (1997) that 
measures the degree of creditors ' control on the assets of debtors in case of 
bankruptcy. Following Galindo and Micco (2004), we modify this variable slightly by 
interacting it with the rule of law in order to capture the extent of law enforcement 
on what is effectively written in bankruptcy laws.  This variable is denoted as 
effective creditor rights. 
Other variables included in the empirical analysis are the extent to which property 
rights are protected, the duration of a bankruptcy procedure and finally the legal 
origin
21. While more institutional variables have been used in other empirical 
studies, we focus on these five which are strictly related to the issue of creditor 
rights protections that this paper wants to address. Details on the variables, their 
source and construction are found in Appendix 1. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the data set used in our study. The 
table shows that developed countries on average have higher values for the 
creditor protection measures than developing ones. Also of interest is that large 
firms in developed countries appear to have a lower share of bank credit than firms 
in developing ones. This could be explained by the fact that in developed countries 
firms have access to other external sources of finance such as equity markets. 
This however, should be particularly true for large firms; small firms tend to rely 
more on banking credit. When we focus on small firms exclusively we find that 
bank financing is significantly larger in developed countries relative to developing 
ones. In developed countries small firms finance about 19.6% of their investment 
with bank credit. In developing countries this share is only 10.7 %. It is worth noting   14
that, on a country-wide level, the pair wise correlation between firm access to bank 
credit and a traditional measure of financial development (ratio of credit to the 
private sector to GDP) is 54% and significant at the 1% significance level. 
Excluding developed countries the correlation rises to 64%. This data is hence 
validated by commonly used macro data. 
The following section proposes an empirical strategy to explore the main 
issues of our model using the data set described above and then reports the 
results. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 
The theoretical model above suggests that relative to large firms, small firms 
should have less access to credit in countries where creditor rights are 
unprotected. In order to test this formally we estimate two types of empirical 
models designed to test if the financing gap between small and large firms and 
medium-sized and large firms is larger in countries where creditors are 
unprotected. As proxies of creditor protection we use the whole range of variables 
described in the previous section.  Both sets of estimates use as dependent 
variable the share of financing coming from banks described in the previous 
section, but they differ in the way it is used. 
The first set of estimates uses country averages by groups of firms. Firms are 
grouped according to their size. Using this methodology we have three 
observations per country: the average of the share of bank financing for small, 
medium and large firms in each country of our sample
22. We regress this variable 
against dummy variables indicating the size of the firms in the group (small and 
medium), against interactions of these dummies and the variables used as proxies 
for creditor protections, and against country specific dummies. This approach 
allows us to use country fixed effects to control for all observable and unobservable 
country characteristics. In particular, it allows us to control for differences in country 
business opportunities, volatility, level of investment risk and any institutional 
difference across countries. This approach also alleviates the potential problem of 
endogeneity of regulations present in cross-country analysis. Thus, by using data   15
by size groups and controlling for country-wide differences across nations with 
country fixed effects we account for the feedback from financial development in 
terms of firms ' access to credit to regulations
23. Note that including fixed effects 
does not allow us to estimate the direct impact of creditor protection on access to 
credit, but rather allows us to estimate if the financing gap between large and small 
firms and large and medium sized firms depends on creditor protections, as 
suggested by the model above. Given that the dependent variable is naturally 
truncated between 0 and 1, we estimate a two-limit Tobit model. 
Results using the country-group averages are reported in table 4, and are in 
the direction suggested by theory. The coefficients on the size variables reflect 
what is fairly obvious, namely that access to banking credit is lower for small and 
medium-sized firms. According to these estimates, on average small firms finance 
nearly 10 percentage points less of investment with bank credit than large firms, 
and medium-sized firms nearly 5 percentage points less than large firms. The 
coefficients on the interactions show that as creditor protection increases the gap is 
reduced. Note that the coefficients on the interaction of the small size and creditor 
protection are significant in all specifications, and in most of them at the 1% 
significance level. Except for column 4 (which uses the duration of bankruptcy 
procedures as the proxy variable) the interaction between creditor protection and 
the medium size dummy is also significant with the expected sign, indicating that 
medium-sized firms also have better chances to access credit markets when 
creditors are protected. In all regressions, as we should expect, the positive effect 
of creditor protection is larger for small firms than for medium ones. 
These results should be interpreted with caution since they mix different 
types of firms in each group. For example, groups include firms that because of 
their line of activity have more collateral than others (manufacturing firms) with 
those that because of their activities tend to have less collateral, and hence are 
less likely to access banking credit. In addition groups include firms that are subject 
to different types of shocks, such as exporting and non-exporting firms, or firms 
that have access to different types of guarantees, such as publicly owned and 
foreign owned ones. Controlling for such factors is crucial in order to pinpoint   16
whether the differences in bank financing come from differences in creditor 
protection or for other reasons that affect firm finance. 
In order to fully exploit the data set and control for relevant firm level 
characteristics that may affect access to bank finance we also estimate empirical 
models at the firm level. In such cases the dependent variable is not aggregated by 
country-group, but rather the firm observation of the share of bank credit itself. In 
these estimations we control for variables commonly used in this literature, such as 
whether the firm has an export orientation, the firm's ownership structure (whether 
it is government owned or foreign owned), and sector dummies indicating the area 
in which the firm operates. As above, we include size dummies (Small and 
Medium) and interactions between these and the measures of creditor protection. 
Also as above we control for country fixed effects to capture any institutional or 
macroeconomic variable that can also affect access to banking credit. Given that 
the size dummies are interacted with variables that do not vary at the country level 
we use clustered standard errors to adjust them.
24 This is extremely important 
since the variables that interact with the size variables do not vary at the firm level 
but only at the country level. Moulton (1990) demonstrated the serious downward 
biases in the estimated standard errors that can result in estimating the effects of 
aggregate explanatory variables on individual-specific (firm specific in this case) 
response variables. Clustered standard errors contribute to reduce such bias. 
The choice of our empirical methodology is closely related to recent research by 
Greene on fixed effects in limited dependent variable models. Many firm level 
studies have opted to use random effects Tobit models to estimate the impact of 
country wide variables on firm specific truncated indicators, such as the share of 
investment financed by credit, in which accounting for individual effects appears 
relevant
25. However, Greene (2002 and 2003) show that if the explanatory 
variables are not uncorrelated with the individual effects (a usually unpalatable 
assumption), the random effects model can lead to biased estimates of the slope 
parameters of the model. In such a case, the fixed effect Tobit is a preferable 
methodology, given that the bias in the slope parameters attributed to the 
incidental parameter problem tends to be negligible.     17
Results are reported in table 5. With respect to firm level controls we find 
that exporters finance around 9 percent more of their investment with bank loans 
than firms oriented to the domestic market. Foreign and state-owned firms have 
less access to credit than local private firms, though the coefficient on foreign 
ownership is not different from zero. Finally, although not reported in the tables, 
firms in the manufacturing sector, perhaps due to the tangibility of their assets, 
have greater access to bank loans.  
Focusing on the variables of interest to this study, we find that in fact the 
size of the financing gap between large and small firms depends on creditor 
protections. All of the interactions with the small dummy are significant, and the 
signs are as suggested by theory. An increase in creditor protection reduces the 
size of the financing gap. Results for reductions in the financing gap between large 
and medium-sized firms are weaker but also show up in these estimations. Once 
again, to obtain a view of the economic magnitude consider column 2 where the 
results using the effective creditor rights index are depicted. According to these 
results an increase in effective creditor rights from the 20th to the 80th percentile of 
the distribution reduces the financing gap of small and large firms in nearly 10 
percentage points. These are large numbers if we consider that for a country in the 
20th percentile of creditor rights the estimated size of the gap between access to 
bank finance of small and large firms is close to 25 percentage points. 
The last column of the table uses legal origin as a proxy for creditor rights. 
The interpretation of the results is straight forward. In common law countries, the 
difference in the share of investment financed with bank credit between large and 
small firms is approximately 9 percentage points. In non-common law countries this 




This section presents some robustness exercises in order to confirm that the 
results presented in the previous section are not driven by sample selection or by 
the way the dependent variable is defined. In order to test if the level of 
development rather than creditor protection is guiding the results reported in the   18
previous section, we re-estimate the equations above including an interaction 
between the small and medium dummies and a dummy indicating the income level 
of the country where the firm is located. We define three income levels following 
World Bank classifications
26. The results are reported in table 6. After controlling 
for income level, the interaction of the size dummies with rule of law, effective 
creditor rights and the legal code dummy remain significant. Some significance is 
lost in the regressions including property rights and the duration of bankruptcy 
procedures, though the sign remains unaltered. It is interesting to note the 
magnitude of the interactions of the income level dummy with the size dummy. The 
absolute magnitude of the coefficient of such interaction increases as the level of 
development decreases. The difference between bank financing between large 
and small firms is larger in low-income countries. It should be noted however, that 
in high-income countries the interaction is not significant. This again is consistent 
with the notion that in these countries bank finance can be less relevant for large 
firms, given that they have developed capital markets. 
In addition to the exercise above, we re-estimate the empirical model for a 
smaller sample of countries that includes only developing countries (middle and 
low-income countries as defined above). These results are reported in table 7, and 
they are basically identical to those reported previously. Nonetheless, the results 
are weaker when analyzing interactions between the medium-sized dummy and 
the creditor protection measures. Possibly what is driving these results is the very 
definition of medium-sized firms. While firms with more than 50 but fewer than 500 
employees may be thought of as medium sized in developed countries, it is 
possible that these are large firms in developing countries. Given this situation, it is 
not surprising that we do not find consistent significant differences between 
medium and large firms. In any case it is worth stressing that even for a sample 
with similar levels of development there is still evidence that creditor protection 
reduces the financing gap between large and small firms. 
An alternative robustness test in order to guarantee that results are not 
driven by outliers is to re-estimate the regressions repeatedly, dropping a single 
country in each estimation and analyzing the size and significance of the   19
coefficients. In other words, we replicate the estimation several times, each time 
dropping the set of firms corresponding with a specific country. Summary results of 
this exercise are reported in table 8. We show the extreme values (maximum and 
minimum) of the coefficients on the small and medium dummy as well as their 
interaction with the legal origin dummy, and their standard errors are reported. 
Regarding the small size dummy and its interaction with the protection proxy, there 
are no significant changes when eliminating any specific country; this indicates that 
the results are not driven by any outlier country. 
Finally, we perform robustness tests that consider changes to the dependent 
variable. As discussed in Section 3 the WBES survey explores different sources of 
funding for firms. Regarding bank credit, the survey asks for the share of the firms 
investment financed by domestic commercial banks, foreign banks and 
development banks. Throughout the paper we chose to focus on the information 
provided for financing from private banks (domestic and foreign) exclusively. 
We did not include development bank credit given that credit from these 
institutions may respond to different incentives than those from private banks. In 
addition, development banks and commercial banks have different utility functions. 
Development banks usually have some type of social mandate that guides their 
credit decisions. These are not necessarily related with making sound financial 
decisions and tend to be more oriented toward political rather than economic 
incentives. Better creditor protection improves the management of financial risks, 
which is more likely to be part of the utility function of commercial banks rather than 
part of the utility function of development banks. If development banks are doing 
their job, they should be providing funds to firms that for some reason do not have 
access to credit markets. One of those reasons can be poor creditor protection. 
Including development bank credit could potentially reduce the impact of creditor 
protection on access to credit. 
In columns 1 and 2 of table 9 we report estimations using a redefined 
measure of access to bank credit that includes credit from development banks. To 
reduce the amount of output we report results using only two of the five proxies 
used throughout the study, effective creditor rights and legal origin. Even when   20
including this new source of credit in the specification, results remain strong for the 
interactions with the small size dummy but the significance of the interactions with 
the medium sized dummy falls. 
Finally, in columns 3 and 4 we report the same type of estimations for 
another definition of the dependent variable. In this case we exclude foreign bank 
credit and concentrate only on credit provided by local domestic privately owned 
banks. The results are basically identical supporting the view that greater creditor 
protection reduces the financing gap between large and small firms. 
Additional robustness exercises in which we control for the differential 
impact on small and medium firms of different banking structure characteristics, 
such as the share of banking assets owned by the government, the degree of 
concentration of the banking industry and if countries have or not an explicit 
deposit insurance mechanism, are reported in appendix 2. The basic results of the 




Information asymmetries tend to increase financial restrictions for smaller 
creditors that usually have fewer assets to pledge as collateral. The main intuition 
behind this result is that lenders face monitoring costs in order to reduce moral 
hazard. Unfortunately, this monitoring action has a fixed cost per loan, and 
therefore is only worthwhile when the borrower has a high level of wealth, which 
implies a high level of investment. In equilibrium banks will not monitor small firms 
(entrepreneurs with low initial wealth), and therefore these firms will use the risky 
technology that implies a higher probability of bankruptcy. This fact implies that any 
policy that reduces inefficiencies in the bankruptcy procedure will have a greater 
positive effect on small than on large firms. Using a model based on Hölmstrom 
and Tirole (1997, 1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987) we formalized this idea. Our 
model has three testable implications. First, large firms tend to be more leveraged 
than small firms; second, large firms tend to be less volatile than small firms due to 
their technology adoption; and third, improvements in contract enforcement or on   21
the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures increases access to credit for small firms 
relative to large ones. 
This paper reviews evidence on the degree of creditor rights protection and 
access to credit for small and medium-size enterprises. Results are drawn from a 
survey of firms around the world to explore the role of creditor protection on small 
and medium-size enterprises' access to credit. In particular, we test whether the 
share of firm investment financed with bank credit depends on legal protections 
and firm size. Concurring with the predictions of our model, we present evidence 
that small firms are less leveraged and more volatile than large ones. In addition, 
using econometric techniques that allow us to deal with observed and unobserved 
country specific components as well as with partial endogeneity, we find that better 
protection of creditors reduces the financing gap between small and large firms. 
The degree to which smaller firms are constrained depends on the quality of the 
regulatory framework, suggesting that in countries where creditor rights are 
protected (and enforced), smaller firms have greater access to bank credit to 
finance investment. In our sample this effect is large. In common law countries 
(where creditor protection is high), the difference in the share of investment 
financed with bank credit between large and small firms is approximately 9 
percentage points. In non-common law countries this difference is 25 percentage 
points.    22
     
APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES 
 
     
Variable Definition Source
Firm Level Data
Share of Bank Finance
Enterprise managers responses when asked how much of their investment was 
financed over the last year with credit from local commercial banks. For 
robustness exercises we use definitions that include credit from foreign banks 
and credit from development banks.
World Business Environment Survey 




Dummy variable equal to one if any government agency or state body has a 
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise.
WBES
Foreign Ownership
Dummy variable equal to one if any foreign company or individual has a 
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise.
WBES
Institutional Data
Rule of Law Composite Rule of Law Indicator
World bank governance indicators 
dataset. Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gover
nance/govdata2002/index.html
Effective Creditor Rights 
Index
Interaction between a creditor rights index and the rule of law indicator. The 
creditor rights index is an indicator of creditor rights in insolvency, based on 
the methodology of La Porta et al (1997 and 1998). The indicator measures 
four powers of secured lenders in liquidation and reorganization: (i) whether 
there are restrictions on entering reorganization, (ii) whether secured creditors 
are able to seize their collateral after the decision for reorganization is 
approved, in other words whether there is no "automatic stay" or "asset 
freeze" imposed by the court. (iii) whether secured creditors are paid first out 
of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm and (iv) whether an 
administrator is responsible for management of the business during the 
resolution of reorganization, instead of having the management of the 
bankrupt debtor continue to run the business. A value of 1 is assigned for 
each variable when a country's laws and regulations provide these powers for 
secured creditors. The aggregate creditor rights index sums the total score 
across all four variables. 
The data is available at the doing 





Assesment on whether financial assets and wealth are clearly delineated and 
protected by law
Global Competitiveness Report
Duration of Bankruptcy 
Procedures
Calendar years that a bankruptcy usually procedure takes. The variable 
captures the average duration that insolvency lawyers estimate is necessary to 
complete a procedure. The measure represents the actual time of the 
insolvency proceedings, not the time that the law may mandate.
The data is available at the doing 





Dummy variable equal to one if a country has a common law legal origin and 
zero otherwise.
Djankov et al (2003)  
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APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
     
 
Regression Results Using Firm Level Data, Controling for banking structure characteristics
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 7.926 8.241 8.352 8.656 8.169
[2.028]*** [2.023]*** [2.070]*** [2.089]*** [2.028]***
Government Ownership -11.799 -11.706 -11.167 -12.877 -12.328
[3.126]*** [3.303]*** [3.181]*** [3.415]*** [3.207]***
Foreign Ownership 0.155 -0.736 -0.797 -0.879 -0.328
[2.798] [2.846] [2.859] [2.919] [2.777]
Small -56.043 -25.076 -29.78 -1.755 -15.499
[17.377]***[15.246] [16.113]* [14.234] [13.766]
Medium -43.953 -25.893 -29.296 -20.328 -23.655
[15.188]***[12.804]** [14.814]** [12.471] [11.933]**
Small*GOV 7.406 -6.359 -7.912 6.775 -6.919
[14.887] [15.329] [14.948] [16.487] [15.818]
Medium*GOV 22.535 18.356 8.73 28.247 19.281
[10.776]** [12.098] [10.979] [13.131]** [12.549]
Small*CONCENT -8.819 -3.364 -11.522 2.637 -2.971
[8.581] [7.946] [8.159] [7.551] [8.015]
Medium*CONCENT 0.192 2.133 -0.055 3.919 2.437
[7.132] [6.719] [6.667] [6.463] [6.683]
Small*D_Ins 5.981 4.355 -3.255 -16.432 -5.845
[15.018] [18.539] [15.231] [18.875] [16.546]
Medium*D_Ins 23.942 18.717 20.972 14.815 18.913
[13.875]* [16.308] [13.610] [16.979] [15.052]
Small*rule of law 70.777
[17.776]***
Medium*rule of law 35.55
[15.419]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 24.319
[13.985]*






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -4.241
[1.251]***
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -1.012
[0.963]
Small*Common Law Origin 12.086
[6.552]*
Medium*Common Law Origin 1.939
[6.199]
Observations 5230 5101 4404 5031 5230
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 5 04 94 24 85 0
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj  + β8*Smallij * GOBj + β9*Mediumij * GOBj  + + β10*Smallij * CONCENTj + β11*Mediumij * 
CONCENTj  +  β12*Smallij * D_Insj + β13*Mediumij * D_Insj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the 
country.  Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a 
dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if 
the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has 
any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise.
Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 
and less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. GOB is the share of assets of the banking system owned by 
government owned banks, CONCENT is a measure of concentration of the banking industry that represents the share of 
banking system's assets owned by the 5 largest banks, and D_Ins is a dummy variable taking value 1 when there is an 
explicit deposit insurance system in the country. Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in 
country j. hj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Share of Bank Credit - Average Values




The source of the data is the WBES and  is computed based on firm level surveys. Small firms are defined as 
those with thes than 50 workers but more than 5. Medium sized firms are those with more than 50 but less than 
500. Large firms are those with more than 500 workers. The countries included in the sample are: Albania, 
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia,Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Rep, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad&Tobago, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States, Uzbekistan,and Venezuela
 
 
Table 2: Job Reallocation by Firm Size
Plant Size Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico U.S.A 
less than 50 workers 0.40 0.40 0.29 0.18 0.34
50-100 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.26
100-250 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.20
more than 250 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.14
Period 1991-2000 1986-1999 1977-1999 1993-2000 1973-1988
Sector All Enterprises Manuf. Manuf. Manuf  Manuf.
Job Turnover is defined as the sum of the absolute value of plant's employment changes divided 
by the average total employment in years t-1 and t.Sources: Davis,Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) 
and IDB (2004) 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Share of Bank 
Credit in Small 
Firms (%)
Share of Bank 
Credit in Medium 
Sized Firms (%)
Share of Bank 













                Mean  11.4 17.1 25.7 0.5 0.3 4.3 2.9
                Standard Deviation  10.1 11.7 14.6 0.2 0.2 1.2 2.3
Developing Country Sample
                Mean  10.7 17.0 26.3 0.5 0.2 3.9 3.1
                Standard Deviation  9.3 11.9 14.5 0.1 0.2 1.1 2.4
Developed Country Sample
                Mean  19.6 18.3 19.9 0.8 0.4 5.7 1.8
                Standard Deviation  11.8 11.4 16.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8
The first three columns in the table report the average share of investment financed with credit from private banks in small firms, 
medium sized firm and large firms respectively. The data ranges between 0 and 100%, and the source is the WBES. The column 4 
reports a Rule of Law index normalized between 0 and 1. Larger values mean higher rule of law. Column 5 reports a measure of 
effective creditor rights that interacts La Porta et al (1997) measure of creditor rights with the rule of law index. Effective creditor 
rights is also bounded between 0 and 1; higher values means higher creditor rights protection. Column 6 reports a measure of property 
rights protection. The minimum value of the index is 1 and the maximum is 7. Higher values reflect greater protection of property 
rights. Column 7 reports the duration of bankruptcy procedures in years. Higher values imply a longer procedure. The source of the 
data is reported in the appendix.
The sample of developing countries incluyes Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belice, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, 
Trinidad&Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistán, and Venezuela. The sample of developed countries incluyes Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Table 4: Regression Results Using Country-Size Level Data
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Averqage Value per Country-Group)
1234 5
Small -26.575 -13.077 -24.905 -6.245 -10.394
[3.037]*** [1.735]*** [3.852]*** [1.858]*** [1.205]***
Medium -16.162 -6.182 -16.244 -2.175 -4.359
[3.004]*** [1.709]*** [3.764]*** [1.830] [1.164]***
Small*rule of law 34.111
[5.516]***
Medium*rule of law 24.76
[5.45]***
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 18.359
[5.784]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.979
[0.502]*
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.468
[0.489]
Small*Common Law Origin 9.856
[3.069]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 7.584
[3.053]**
Observations 156 152 128 149 156
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 6 15 94 85 86 1
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Smallij + β2*Mediumij + 
β3*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β4*Mediumij * Protection Proxyj + ηj + εij. i denotes the sector size (small,
medium, or large) and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the average share of investment financed
with bank credit in firms of size i in country j. Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have
more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise.
ηj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
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Table 5: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 8.837 9.252 8.779 9.694 9.119
[1.947]*** [1.953]*** [2.011]*** [2.030]*** [1.968]***
Government Ownership -9.398 -9.895 -9.045 -10.634 -9.802
[2.999]*** [3.102]*** [3.188]*** [3.206]*** [3.036]***
Foreign Ownership -0.696 -1.43 -3.251 -1.603 -1.087
[2.696] [2.793] [2.700] [2.864] [2.691]
Small -55.162 -29.613 -39.6 -13.742 -24.741
[9.156]*** [4.253]*** [8.962]*** [4.735]*** [3.437]***
Medium -23.976 -10.428 -21.467 -5.287 -8.047
[8.057]*** [3.510]*** [8.879]** [4.050] [2.810]***
Small*rule of law 64.147
[14.850]***
Medium*rule of law 33.948
[13.432]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 30.031
[9.574]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -2.934
[1.109]***
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.379
[0.843]
Small*Common Law Origin 15.781
[5.538]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 9.39
[4.813]*
Observations 6153 5998 4865 5928 6153
Number of Countries 62 60 49 59 62
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of 
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports 
and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small 
and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less 
than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in 
country j. ηj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
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Table 6: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data (Controlling by level of income)
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
Exporting Firm 8.859 9.245 8.746 9.719 9.079
[1.976]*** [1.970]*** [2.053]*** [2.037]*** [1.966]***
Government Ownership -9.815 -10.626 -9.618 -11.406 -10.395
[2.994]*** [3.110]*** [3.196]*** [3.183]*** [3.015]***
Foreign Ownership -0.836 -1.198 -3.248 -1.192 -0.758
[2.667] [2.773] [2.687] [2.848] [2.674]
Small*Low Income -48.537 -41.455 -26.886 -29.925 -39.336
[10.325]*** [8.311]*** [8.811]*** [9.368]*** [7.842]***
Medium* Low Income -29.426 -16.353 -27.009 -10.308 -14.659
[9.540]*** [7.218]** [10.191]*** [8.578] [6.846]**
Small*Middle Income -40.812 -28.707 -28.606 -18.846 -25.838
[10.792]*** [4.203]*** [9.842]*** [4.925]*** [3.437]***
Medium* Middle Income -30.27 -10.931 -22.134 -6.157 -7.573
[9.842]*** [3.448]*** [9.495]** [4.226] [2.764]***
Small*High Income -18.968 1.673 -0.654 12.33 4.258
[16.375] [7.467] [14.614] [7.371]* [7.326]
Medium* High Income -39.224 -6.206 -22.503 0.382 -3.316
[15.198]*** [7.211] [13.935] [6.818] [6.677]
Small*rule of law 34.147
[17.084]**
Medium*rule of law 47.893
[16.899]***
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 20.594
[9.441]**






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -1.895
[1.183]
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.141
[0.951]
Small*Common Law Origin 13.767
[5.231]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 10.061
[5.140]*
Observations 6153 5998 4865 5928 6153
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 6 26 04 95 96 2
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country j. ηj is a country fixed effect. The 
dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. Low Income, Medium Income and High Income countries are dummies 
indicating the income level of a country following World Bank classification.
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij 
+β2*Government Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij * Low Incomej+ β5*Mediumij   * Low Incomej 
+ β6*Smallij * Medium Incomej + β7*Mediumij * Medium Incomej + β8*Smallij * High Incomej + β9*Mediumij * 
High Income j + β10*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β11*Mediumij * Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the 
firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed with bank credit in i in 
country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. Government 
ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign 
ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and Medium 
are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 
500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data (Sample of Developing Countries)
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 9.109 9.615 9.002 10.137 9.517
[2.153]*** [2.145]*** [2.244]*** [2.249]*** [2.144]***
Government Ownership -9.19 -10.085 -8.599 -10.922 -10.146
[3.153]*** [3.267]*** [3.383]** [3.375]*** [3.175]***
Foreign Ownership 0.598 0.228 -2.058 0.223 0.686
[2.825] [2.942] [2.825] [3.038] [2.821]
Small -43.617 -32.761 -26.378 -19.157 -27.81
[9.945]*** [4.364]*** [9.264]*** [5.097]*** [3.516]***
Medium -26.899 -12.141 -19.92 -5.81 -7.856
[9.411]*** [3.592]*** [9.591]** [4.397] [2.883]***
Small*rule of law 38.596
[17.053]**
Medium*rule of law 41.819
[16.659]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 30.426
[8.896]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -2.201
[1.135]*
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.34
[0.880]
Small*Common Law Origin 15.432
[5.191]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 6.934
[4.622]
Observations 5600 5445 4312 5375 5600
Number of Countries 53 51 40 50 53
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β 2 *Governmen
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij *P r o t e c t i o n
Proxyj +D ij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed
with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise.
Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign
ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and Medium are dummies
taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 500 workers respectively
a n d0o t h e r w i s e .D ij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country j. ηj is a country fixed effect.
The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
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Small Minimum Value -63.236 -32.147 -49.73 -15.866 -26.618
[8.605]** [4.228]** [7.893]** [4.797]** [3.429]**
Maximum Value -51.095 -28.17 -37.042 -10.925 -23.346
[8.739]** [4.107]** [8.918]** [4.347]* [3.321]**
Small*Protection Proxy Minimum Value 55.836 25.882 4.191 -4.107 13.246
[14.808]** [9.432]** [1.962]* [1.319]** [5.419]*
Maximum Value 75.736 34.336 6.976 -2.4 19.21
[14.063]** [9.352]** [1.771]** [1.167]* [5.772]**
Medium Minimum Value -26.14 -11.52 -25.762 -6.786 -8.787
[8.036]** [3.487]** [9.704]** [4.163] [2.809]**
Maximum Value -21.893 -9.305 -18.117 -3.36 -7.126
[7.975]** [3.539]** [8.592]* [4.417] [2.786]*
Medium*Protection Proxy Minimum Value 30.47 9.411 2.925 -1.286 7.316
[13.845]* [10.893] [1.885] [1.070] [4.979]
Maximum Value 38.646 19.074 4.462 0.162 13.663
[13.085]** [8.598]* [2.082]* [0.825] [4.570]**
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij 
*Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of 
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports 
and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise.
 Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and 
less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. The protection proxies are defined as in the previous tables. The 
dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. Succesive regressions are dropped, and in each one country at a time is 
dropped. The table reports the maximum and minimum variables of a set of relevant coefficients obtained in this exercise.
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Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
123 4
Exporting Firm 8.778 8.823 4.01 4.183
[1.871]*** [1.881]*** [2.223]* [2.175]*
Government Ownership -5.604 -5.674 14.567 12.122
[3.084]* [3.018]* [5.114]*** [4.942]**
Foreign Ownership -0.507 -0.098 -15.819 -14.901
[2.784] [2.702] [3.297]*** [3.165]***
Small -32.129 -24.092 -23.335 -20.753
[4.115]*** [3.337]*** [4.665]*** [3.768]***
Medium -9.212 -6.03 -0.143 0.146
[3.275]*** [2.670]** [3.808] [3.100]
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 37.706 24.158
[9.583]*** [10.744]**
Medium*Ef. Creditor Rights 14.812 4.426
[8.701]* [9.949]
Small*Common Law Origin 11.681 19.153
[5.218]** [5.005]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 4.473 3.737
[4.539] [4.375]
Observations 5998 6153 5998 6153
Number of Countries 60 62 60 62
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj +D ij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the share of
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and
0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and
Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than
5 0 0w o r k e r sr e s p e c t i v e l ya n d0o t h e r w i s e .D ij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country
j.hj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is
the sum of credit provided by private commercial banks and development banks.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Including Development 
Bank Finance
Excluding Foreign Bank 
Finance
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1 See La Porta et al (1997, 1998) for detailed discussions. 
2 See for example Clarke et al. (2001), Beck et al. (2001), Beck et al. (2003) and Love and Mylenko 
(2003). 
3 In section 3 we describe how the data is constructed. At this stage it is convenient to point out that 
small firms are defined as those more than 5 but with fewer than 50 employees. Medium sized firms 
are those with more than 50 but fewer than 500, and large firms are those with more than 500 
workers. 
4 Turnover is defined as the sum of the absolute value of plant's employment changes divided by 
the average total employment in years t-1 and t. See Davis, et al (1996) and IPES (2003). 
5 Several papers have shown that there is a relationship between legal protections and the size of 
credit markets. See for example La Porta et al (1997 and 1998), Djankov et al (2005), Bianco, 
Japelli and Pagano (2005) among others. Laeven and Majnoni (2005) show the impact of creditor 
protections on the cost of credit.  
6 The extension of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) of Townsend (1979)'s costly state verification 
model, the Aghion et al (1999) model, as well as the effort moral hazard a la Holstrom and Tirole 
(1997,1998) imply that the amount of credit is linear on firm 's wealth. If on top, we assume 
decreasing returns to scale to investment we have that small firms should be more leveraged than 
large ones. In addition, in all these models, in equilibrium all firms adopt the same type of 
technology (either a risky or a safe one). 
7 Most papers base their idea on Stiglitz and Weiss(1981), or on models with costly state 
verification,  as in Williamson (1987). In general, even if informational asymmetries and contract 
enforcement problems do not lead to credit rationing, they make external funds imperfect 
substitutes for internal funds and invalidate the separation between financing and investment 
choices implied by the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. 
8 Bernanke and Gertler (1989 and 1990), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1990), Gertler (1992), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996 and 1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988 and 1993) are examples of this literature. Although the models 
differ in their details, two main results emerge from this literature. First, external finance is more 
costly than internal finance unless loans are fully collateralized. Second, the premium on external 
finance is an inverse function of a borrower's net worth (liquid assets plus the collateral value of 
illiquid assets). Any negative shock to net worth (due to technological reasons, shift in investors' 
preferences, or changes in monetary policy) leads to an increase in the premium and, therefore, to 
a reduction in investment and production. For this reason the initial impact of the shock may be 
amplified (the so-called "financial accelerator" effect). 
9 See Schiantarelli (1996) or Hubbard (1998) for a review of several criteria that have been used in 
the literature to divide firms into groups according to the likelihood of being financially constrained. 
The main cross-sectional criteria used to identify firms for whom information and agency problems 
are more or less severe are affiliation with industrial groups and banks, foreign ownership, and size. 
10 "Financing obstacle" describes the perception of entrepreneurs about credit availability in their 
country. A methodological problem is that this variable is very likely to be correlated with most of 
their regressors. In some specification, the authors also include, in addition to "Financing obstacle" 
the Heritage Foundation "property rights" index. 
11 Both technologies have the same expected return: 
Ω = − + = − + L R L R
r r r s s s ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * π π π π  
12 These are standard assumptions in this literature. 
13 Formally, we assume that the percentage reduction in expected profits due to bankruptcy costs 
are smaller than the percentage increase in leverage due to the fact the banks, in good times, 
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The numerator in the right hand side is the expected lost (per unit of investment) due to bankruptcy 
costs. The denominator is the net present value - NPV of the project. The first term in the left hand   32
                                                                                                                                                     
side is the "equity multiplier" in the case where banks lend without bankruptcy risk, and the 
numerator, loosely speaking, is the increase in the "equity multiplier" due to the fact that the bank 
will receive a higher payment in case of success than of failure (positive loan interest rate). 
14 By assumption the project's net present value of shirking is lower than the one with effort (even 
considering the private benefit), this implies that: 
B L R L R
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16 This is true by the assumption that the net present value of shirking is lower than the one with 
effort. See footnote 10. 
17 This new dataset has been recently used in various cross country studies. See Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) or Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2004) for an 
example. 
18 See for example La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Djankov et al (2003). 
19 It is important to note that there may be problems with the measurements of these variables 
individually, given the ambiguous way in which the question was asked. It is unclear if the 
interpretation of the foreign bank question was the same across countries and entrepreneurs. Some 
respondents could have interpreted foreign banks as offshore lenders, in which case the local bank 
would capture lending from local banks that are foreign owned, while others could have interpreted 
them as local (onshore) lenders owned by foreign parties in which case the local banks variable 
would capture only lending by local banks that are owned by a party of the same country. However, 
when taking both items together this problem is not present. Moreover, the model does not refer to 
bank lenders of specific nationalities. In theory both national and foreign parties will be affected in 
the same way by creditor protections. 
20 See La Porta el al (1997 and 1998), and Galindo and Micco (2004). 
21 Several authors have linked a common law legal origin with better protection of creditors. See for 
example La Porta et al (1997 and 1998). 
22 We drop groups in which we have fewer than 15 firms to compute the averages. That is, if a 
country does not have at least 15 observations in a size group, that size group for that specific 
country is dropped out of the sample. 
23 For example, it can be argued that more stringent regulations protecting creditors may arise as 
financial markets develop. 
24 See Multon (1990) and Judson and Owen (1996). 
25 See Beck et al (2001) as an example. 
26 In the high income group country we include OECD high-income countries. In terms of our 
sample these include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and United States. In the middle income group we include Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, 
Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Rep, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Finally in the low-income group we include Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Georgia, Haiti, 
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